I am a CNRS Researcher at the Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics at Sciences Po in Paris. My research interests are in comparative political economy, public policy and legislative politics.
I am currently working on three main projects that utilize a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods. Building on historical, mathematical, and statistical analyses, the first (book) project examines how private insurance is quietly reshaping Continental European welfare states by empowering market actors, reinforcing labor market dualization, and eroding public support for social insurance.
The second project explores the political economy of corruption and legislative favoritism in various countries and its redistributive implications at the firm level. As part of this latter project, I am currently building with colleagues (and making available) large-scale micro level datasets about legislative and regulatory processes in various countries around the world.
Lastly, I was recently awarded research funding to experimentally study how the transparency—or lack thereof—of legislative websites may erode confidence in government and fuel conspiratorial thinking.
At Sciences Po, I teach courses in political science, public policy and political economy. I’m also the incoming scientific advisor for the ‘Politics and Public Policy’ stream at the School of Public Affairs.
You can access a recent version of my CV here and reach me at cyril.benoit@cnrs.fr. Below, you can find summaries of some of my recent work.
Selected PUBLICATIONS
Forthcoming in Competition & Change.
Asset-based welfare (ABW) – the use of public policy interventions to encourage individuals to accumulate assets for future welfare needs – has gained prominence across European economies. This looks like a familiar story of policy transfer from an Anglo-liberal epicenter, the UK, in which ABW emerged as a corollary to the country’s growth model. Drawing on short case studies across diverse welfare and growth regimes, this paper argues instead that ABW’s spread is better understood as a common response to similarly interpreted demographic and fiscal pressures. We further show that ABW generates distinct structural tensions depending on its context. In the UK, it is parasitic upon the very growth that the growth regime is there to produce. In more export-oriented, consumption-repressing regimes, ABW may prove more economically viable, but its regressive logic—benefiting the asset-rich while disadvantaging the asset-poor—threatens to fracture the cross-class coalitions that underpin welfare provision. The paper thus challenges standard models of policy diffusion and underscores ABW’s disruptive potential for welfare state politics across diverse political economies.
Published in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies.
In December 2023, the European Parliament and the Council reached an agreement to revise the Solvency II Directive, aiming to unlock €100 billion in private investment through a series of deregulatory measures. This marks a significant departure from the stringent insurance supervision framework that has shaped European policy since the financial crisis. Through detailed process tracing, this article examines the drivers behind this unexpected outcome and its broader implications for EU economic governance. Whilst this shift could be seen as part of the EU’s growing prioritization of growth over stability, we argue that it is, above all, the result of France’s sustained influence. Our findings suggest that the fragmented insurance industry played a limited role in the negotiations. Although the Commission actively promoted the Capital Markets Union and investment in the green transition, it largely acted as a reactive and pragmatic policy-maker. Instead, we show that the reregulation of the European insurance sector was primarily driven by the sustained efforts of the French Treasury. However, rather than pushing for wholesale deregulation, French policy-makers leveraged the Solvency II review to advance a cohesive asset-led growth strategy at home – motivated by a desire for greater economic sovereignty through the inflow of liquidity into national companies. Taken together, these findings shed new light on EU financial regulation in the post-Covid era, the evolving tension between the EU’s interventionist shift and the rise of state activism and France’s role in shaping European economic governance.
Published in Political Studies Review.
What explains changes in the economic structures, institutions and policies of Advanced Capitalist Democracies (ACDs)? In this article, we suggest that the various answers to this question in the field of Comparative Political Economy (CPE) are essentially linked to two main approaches. The first approach emphasizes the role of electorates and political parties, their transformations, and their competition in shaping the evolution of ACDs. The second approach highlights the primacy of producer groups as the most powerful actors influencing the trajectory of ACDs. This review article introduces the debate between these two approaches and underscores its enduring relevance. It then discusses four recent important contributions that provide renewed perspectives on what remains a structuring cleavage in CPE, with implications for neighbouring fields in political science research. Through a systematic comparison of their analytical structure accross various dimensions, we show that their conception of the economy critically shapes their understanding of politics.
Published in Business and Politics.
Business power is thought to increase over time when private actors are involved in the provision of public goods and services. This paper argues that this is partially true – and that in certain circumstances, state actors can even swiftly regain control of sectors previously ceded to private interests. When the latter fulfill some public functions on behalf or as delegates of the state, policymakers face ever greater pressures to sustain a relationship flawed by principal-agent problems – allowing business actors to derive appreciable political benefits. However, these conditions do not hold true after deregulation – when state actors retreat from a sector and attempt to direct the newly created market through licensing, norms and standard-setting. We demonstrate that deregulation sets the stage for a more competitive environment, making it harder for private interests to cooperate. This, in turn, can allow policymakers to enhance regulatory capacities and seize opportunities to highlight the shortcomings of private provision. After establishing this argument theoretically, we illustrate its implications through a comparative case-study of the health insurance sector in two European countries – Belgium and France.
Politicians, Regulators and Regulatory Governance
Published in Regulation & Governance.
We offer a series of reflective insights about the state and direction of studies related to the politics of regulation. Notably we argue that the field is characterized by persisting divisions between Americanists and Europeanists. Largely focused on the actions taken by political principals, the former regularly report a substantial politicization of regulatory behavior. Reflecting on recent developments in US politics however, we show that political influence could be overestimated in the United States. Symmetrically, this same influence could be underestimated by Europeanists, who for now have largely focused on regulators and agencies. This is notably suggested by a discussion of recent developments in European politics, as revealed by contributions systematically measuring agency politicization in Western European democracies. On this basis, we identify some promising research questions and agendas for future studies on the politics of regulation.
WORKING PAPER
The Political Economy of Legislative Favouritism (with Klea Ibrahimi and Mihaly Fazekas)
Forthcoming presentation at the CBS-Princeton Conference on Money in Politics.
Politicians may enact legislation that disproportionately benefits selected firms over competitors, yet systematic evidence of legislative favouritism’s distributive implications are scarce. We address this gap by offering a comprehensive micro-level analysis of how favouristic legislation shapes market outcomes, linking UK legislative data to large-scale financial information on all registered firms. Given favouritism’s concealed nature, we identify risk factors–excessive legislative production, lack of parliamentary scrutiny, frequent amendments, and non-standard procedures–that proxy its presence. We find that laws associated with these factors significantly boost profits of outlier high-growth firms relative to competitors, but at the expense of sector-wide economic growth. The paper thus highlights the market-distorting effects of high favouritism-risk legislation and its role in consolidating political influence through concentrated economic gains. By demonstrating that administrative data can reliably proxy favouritism risk, this study also opens new avenues for real-time detection and accountability in legislative politics.